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BONA FIDE PURCHASER-WITHOUT TITLE1
By JoHN E. HoWEv
The legal mind in time of confusion resorts to the use of
ancient maxims and Latin phrases in an effort to bring order
from chaos. Unless that mind has a fundamental traming m
Latin and Legal History-and few minds have such trainingthe use of such material tends to further mire the person in the
depths of misunderstanding. Judicial decisions based on such
reasoning are entirely worthless, as the propounders themselves
fail to have a basic concept of the idea or thought that is being
advanced.
If we seek further we will find that it is not uncommon for
the teacher, attorney and student of law to justify decisions of
the courts through the use of these phrases. If the legally trained
are given a hypothetical case wherein Jones purchases a wagon
from Smith, the true owner being Green, a diversity of opinion
will arise as to the outcome of the case wherein Green brings an
action to forecast the result from the facts that have been given,
but many persons would hold that Green should be allowed to
recover the wagon. When asked the reason for their decision they
would reply that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, and
therefore Jones is not protected. Another segment of the questioned persons would hold that Jones has a right to retain the
wagon, and they in turn would reason that this result was
proper for the simple reason that Jones was a bona fide purchaser, and that the bona fide purchaser is always permitted to
keep the subject matter of the sale.
The thought that the bona fide purchaser should be protected and the doctrine of caveat emptor are basically divergent.
In fact, the words, bona fide purchaser, have caused no end of
confusion in the study of the law. Possibly much of this con* LL.B., Kentucky; LL.M., Michigan. Instructor, Creighton Um-

versity School of Law Omaha (2) Neb.
Cases involving the bona fide purchaser may be divided into
three main classes; cases wherein the vendor has legal title, cases in
which the vendor has an equitable title, and those instances wherein
the vendor has no title to pass to the vendee. Each class presents its
own problem, and the result in any given case depends on the type
of title which the vendor possessed.
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fusion results from the fact that these words are employed as a
descriptive term, and also as an absolute rule of law. Essentially
the naked term is merely descriptive of a certain type of purchaser, and if the words are used to indicate a rule of law then
the entire rule should be stated, no attempt at brevity being made
by resort to the descriptive phrase itself. Such a procedure will
be followed in this discussion, the phrase, bona fide purchaser,
being used to designate a purchaser. in good faith for value.
With this definition in mind it will then be possible to discuss
the primary problem of the bona fide purchaser from the vendor
who has neither equitable nor legal title. From that discussion it
should then be possible to formulate certain rules which will
show the protection afforded such a purchaser by the courts.
CHtARACTERISTICS o THE BONA FIDE PURCHASER
Accepting the statement that the term, bona fide purchaser,
refers to a type of purchaser, it then becomes necessary to discover the actual elements that must be present in order for the
purchaser to come within the category An analysis of the cases
will reveal that there are two prime requisites needed in order
for one to be a bona fide purchaser, the purchase must be made
in good faith and value must be given the vendor. 2
From a practical standpoint the element of good faith will
give little trouble. The question is one that is primarily for the
jury, and they must decide the.issue from the evidence which
is presented to them on the trial of the case.
Conceding the point that the jury must determine whether
or not the purchase was made in good faith, there is some dispute
concering the question of whether good faith is a lack of bad
faith or a lack of negligence on the part of the purchaser. Under
the former view the requirements of good faith are somewhat
liberalized mnarmuch as the purchaser must actually act in bad
faith to except himself from the classification.
The attitude of finding actual bad faith has met with favor
m cases involving negotiable instruments.3 In the early English
cases dealing with negotiable instruments the courts were in2There are statements to the effect that a bona fide purchaser
must also have title to the article. If such a requirement is essential
the term is under consideration as a rule of law and not as a de-

scriptive term.
'NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS LAW § 56.
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elined to hold that the purchase was made in good faith if there
was an absence of bad faith.4 Then, for some unexplained
reason, there was a strong condemnation of the existing law, and
the court went to the opposite extreme, decreeing that a purchase
under suspicious circumstances prevented the purchase from
being one that was made in good faith5 Evidently this narrow
idea of absence of negligence met with disfavor, because the
rule soon changed, and the courts adopted the view that the
purchase was made in good faith as long as there was an absence
of gross negligence in the purchase. 6 Thus in the space of a few
years the English courts ran the gamut of possible decisions,
and upon completing the circle, they arrived at their original
view-a purchase was made in good faith as long as it was made
without actual bad faith or without gross negligence on the part
of the purchaser.
In the United States the common law decisions regarding
purchase of negotiable instruments show that the various courts
adopted one or the other of the English views, some of the states
adopting the original bad faith rule, while in other jurisdictions
the suspicious circumstance. thought prevailed. This conflict in
the decisions was resolved in favor of the bad faith rule up-on
the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Section 56 of
the law provides "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the
instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the
same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual
knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts
that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
The cases which have been decided since the adoption of the
uniform law conclusively prove that the suspicious circumstance
test has been abolished, and that we now use the more lenient bad
faith test. Even though the cases follow the rule that good faith
is a lack of bad faith it is interesting to note that the quoted
section provides that there is a. lack of good faith if the purchaser has-" knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the
instrument amounted to bad faith." It can thus be seen that the
'Lawson v Weston, 4 Esp. 56 (1801), Peacock v. Rhodes, 2 Doug.
633 (1781).
'Slater v. West, 3 Car. & P 325 (1828) Gill v. Cubit, 3 B. & C.
466 (1824)
'Uther v. Rich, 10 Ad. & El. 784 (1839), Goodman v. Harvey, 4
Ad. & El. 870 (1836) Backhouse v Harrison, 5 B. & A. 1098 (1834).
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jury can find that certain suspicious circumstances in a given

case amount to notice of such facts as to make the purchase one
that is made in bad faith. For this reason it might be possible
to find that a purchase was not made in good faith, even though
bad faith was not shown in the transaction.
The discussion regarding the element of good faith as applied to negotiable instruments may also be said to state the law
regarding purchases of other forms of personalty The question
of good faith in those cases must be determined by the jury,
but in those states that have adopted the Uniform Sales Act
there is little question but that good faith is shown by proving
absence of actual bad faith. Section 76 of the act provides that
a thing is done in good faith when it isdone honestly, irrespective of the fact that it may have been done negligently s There
is also evidence that this same result is reached in the absence
of the specific statutory provision.9
The question of value is a topic which could be discussed
endlessly if one desired to investigate the Instorical development
of the problem. At the present time it will suffice to say that
value is any consideration which would support a simple contract.',' However, it is well to note that the stated rule regarding
value has particular application to cases involving negotiable
instruments. In regard to other forms of personalty the rule
will be essentially the same, but it has been held that a preexisting debt isnot sufficient consideration to support the contention that the vendee was a bona fide purchaser."i
'WILLISTON, SALES § 621.

The statutory provision would only apply to those cases which

would come under the act, but this would control in many of the
cases involving the bona fide purchaser.
'Hoham v Aukerman-Tuesburg Motors, 17 Ind. App. 316, 133
N.E. 507 (1922) The court found that a purchase was made in good
faith even though the vendee questioned the vendor concerning the
title, and the vendor answered that he could not remember where
he had purchased the article.
"Section 25 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides: "Value
is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value; and is deemed such
whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time."
Even though negotiable instrument law is applicable to a limited
group of cases, nevertheless it will be found that it is in this one
field where the bona fide purchaser without title is protected. For
this reason the tests used in the negotiable instrument field are of
importance.
"

Schloss v Feltus, 103 Mich. 525, 61 N.W 797 (1895)
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In certain instances there are statutory rules for determining whether or not a purchaser is a bona fide purchaser. One
illustration is in the field of negotiable instruments. The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that in order to be a bona fide
purchaser (actually called a holder in due course) the purchaser
must-in addition to fulfilling the requirements as to value and
good faith-have purchased an instrument which is complete
and regular on its face, must have become the holder of the instrument before the same was overdue, and without notice that
it had been previously dishonored, if such was a fact, and at the
time the instrument was given to the purchaser he must have had
no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the
12
title of the person that negotiated the same to him.
The legislative additions add little to the ordinary tests for
a bona fide purchaser which have been set forth. If the purchaser fails to fulfill any of the additional tests that are set up
in the enactment it will be found that the purchase was not made
in good faith. The only advantage of the additional statutory
requirements is to standardize the determination of good faith.
From this surface examination it can be seen that one will
become a bona fide purchaser by giving value to the vendor and
purchasing the article in good faith.
PROTECTION OF THE BoxA FIDE PURCHASER WITHOUT TITLE

As a general rule the bona fide purchaser is afforded protection in those cases wherein the vendor has the legal or equitable title to the article that is purchased. However, our discussion
is limited to instances wherein the vendor has no title to pass to
his vendee. This particular problem will arise in two types of
cases, one case deals with sales by a bailee, 13 and the other case
involves sales by a thief. It is in these two types of transactions
that the vendor has no title, in all other cases it will be found
that the vendor has either the legal or the equitable title, and
those cases are not within the scope of this discussion.
At the present time there is little need to differentiate between cases wherein the sale is by a thief and the cases wherein
the sale is by a bailee. In the latter type of case the vendor is
'NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS

LAW § 52.

' Bailee is used in this instance in its broader sense so as to in-

clude sales by a pledgee, etc.
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lawfully in possession, but has no title, while the thief has
neither title nor lawful possession. At one time the distinction
was of great importance as purchasers from those who did not
have lawful possession were not protected. However, the law
today does not make a distinction between the two types of sales.
At first the policy of the English Common Law was to protect the bona fide purchaser in cases where the vendor had
possession of the article with the consent of the true owner. 14
Their reason for this holding was based on the thought that m
any case where it is necessary to have one of two innocent persons suffer for the wrong of another, the one who has been the
occasion of the loss should sustain it. In those cases where the
true owner voluntarily gives possession of the article to another,
lie is the one who occasions the loss if there is a subsequent sale,
and he should be the one to bear the loss. This principle would
seem to be just and the results reached would appear to be logical from a practical standpoint. In fact it would seem that there
is no justification for reaching any other result when that
factual situation is present.
This rule, affording protection to the innocent purchaser,
was followed by the courts until the early part of the fourteenth
century At that time the courts allowed themselves to become
influenced by the thought that title is the main concern of the
law. With this idea m mind, it would naturally follow that a
sale by a bailee is void as the bailee does not have title to the
bailed goods. Since there was no title in the bailee none could
pass to the purchaser, and therefore the purchaser would not be
protected in an action by the true owner. The courts, except in a
few cases, adopted this view and since that time have refused to
protect the bona fide purchaser if he does not have title to the
article.iS
In the United States the general rule involving purchases
by innocent vendees is the same as that adopted by the English
Courts. It is to be regretted that the English Courts were refusing protection to the bona fide purchaser at the time our
courts were developing the law in this country If this had not
2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (7th ed. 1775) 449;
WORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (3rd ed. rewritten

15 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 14, at 99.

5 HOLDS1923) 98.
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been the fact it is possible that our courts would have adopted
the preferable earlier English view whieh, did afford protection
to the bona fide purchaser.
In some of the jurisdictions of the United States there is
statutory authority for refusing to protect the interests of the
bona fide purchaser. 16 However, the same result is reached in
the absence of a statute,T and with the exception of a few cases
the innocent purchaser in the United States is not protected
unless the true owner is estopped to assert his title.' s
There is little explanation as to the factors which would
give rise to an estoppel. In some of the reports there is an mdication that the true owner will be estopped to assert his title if
the vendor had something in addition to possession of the
a rticle. However, no case sets forth a yardstick by which one
might measure and analyze those additional items. An exammation will show that there are many cases which would seem to
give rise to an estoppel, but the results do not reach a logical
conclusion nor follow a definite pattern.
In an English case the evidence proved that a coachbuilder
had let a brougham for a year. The hirer, according to the custom, painted his coat of arms on the bailed article, and then later
sold same at a public auction. The coachbuilder then brought an
action against the purchaser to recover the brougham and the
court held that it could be recovered.i 9 The decision was based
on the fact that the purchaser should have known that it was
the custom for the hirers to paint their coat of arms on the
bailed broughams, and that the purchaser should have therefore been more cautious in making the purchase.
' UNIFORM SALES ACT § 23. For a somewhat different type of
statute see Holloway v A. J. Ingersoll Co., Inc., 16 La. App. 494, 133
So. 819 (1931).
'7 Williams et al. v Clement, 189 Ark. 406, 72 S.W (2d) 529
(1934), Hart and another v Carpenter, 24 Conn. 427 (1856), Fawcett v Osborne, 32 Ill. 411, 83 Am. Dec. 278 (1863) Cadwallader v.
Clifton R. Shaw, Inc:; 127 Me. 172, 142 Atl. 580 (1928), Yorkman
et al. v. Harvey, 133 Okla. 252, 271 Pac. 839 (1928) Cooperider et al.
v Myre, 37 Ohio App. 502, 175 N.E. 235 (1930) Anchor Concrete
Machinery Co. v Pennsylvania Brick & Tile Co., 292 Pa. 86, 140 Ati.
766 (1928)
" Hart and another v Carpenter, 24 Conn. 427 (1856) Fawcett
v. Osborne, 32 Ill. 411, 83 Am. Dec. 278 (1863).
"Marner v Banks, 17 L.T. 147 (1867)
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In Dodd v. Edwards20 an auto was rented to a bailee at a
stipulated rental per week. This rental contract was made and
entered into in North Carolina, and subsequently the bailee took
the automobile to South Carolina and sold same to the defendant. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover the automobile even though there was some dispute as to whether or not the
contract should have been recorded. If the contract should have
been recorded it would seem that the bailor's failure to record
would work as an estoppel against him to later assert his title,
but the court indicated that the bailor would not have been
estopped under any circumstance.
It is true that there are some instances wherein bona fide
purchasers are protected. 21 The facts of the cases wherein protection is afforded seem to differ little from the facts wherein
they do not protect the innocent purchaser. In the case of
Heath v. Stoddard2= the owner of a piano gave same to a dealer
so that it might be delivered to a third person. The dealer did
deliver the pianoto that person, but at the same time he sold it
as his property The court held in that case that there was evidence from which the jury might find that the true owner was
estopped to assert his title against the purchaser.
The case of Williams et al. v Clement 23 is comparable to
the Heath Case in all respects except the result. In that case a
piano was delivered to a dealer so that it might be stored. The
owner did agree that the dealer might use the piano for demonstration purposes. The piano was sold and the court refused
to protect the purchaser. They believed that th purchaser
should only be protected when the true owner did some act, or
failed to speak, and the act or refusal to speak misled the pur
chaser. Despite the act of allowing the dealer to use the piano
for demonstration purposes the court could find nothing which
would serve as a basis for an estoppel.
The Connecticut court has followed the majority and refused to protect the bona fide purchaser in a case wherein the
- 172 S.C. 213, 173 S.E. 633 (1934)
-1Heath v. Stoddard, 91 Me. 499, 40 Atl. 547 (1898) Commercial
Motors Mortgage Corporation v Waters, 280 Pa. 177, -124 AtI. 327
(1924), Pickermg v. Busk, 15 East 38 (1812).
2291 Me. 499, 40 Atl. 547 (1898).
189 Ark. 406, 72 S.W (2d) 529 (1934)
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circumstances would seem to justify application of the doctrine
of estoppel. 24 It appears from the facts of that case that the
plaintiff boarded a cow with another person, and gave that person an option to purchase the animal. Without bothering to
exercise the option the person boarding the cow sold her to the
defendant. The court refused to protect this purchaser, although the court did agree that one cannot reclaim property
where he places another in such a position that the other appears to be the owner of the property However, the court said
that in this case the vendor was a mere bailee and that it was
never possible for a mere bailee to appear to be the owner of the
bailed article.
From the cases discussed it can readily be seen that there is
no unanimity regarding the doctrine of estoppel to assert title
against a bona fide purchaser. Even though most of the courts
hold that there may be an estoppel in certain cases their application of the doctrine is limited to a few rare cases.
In the absence of a statute the courts reach the same results
with unlawful pledges that they reach in the case of an unlawful
sale, the pledgee is simply not afforded any protection.2 5 The
reasoning in the pledge cases is analogous to the reasoning in the
sales cases, the possessor of the article has no right to pledge
that article, inasmuch as there is no right to pledge there can
be no right. transferred to the pledgee, and since the pledgee
acquires no right to the article there is no reason why he should
be afforded protection. Basically the reasoning is fallacious, but
it is the type of reasoning that is advanced by the courts in the
cases of unlawful pledges.
We have already mentioned that there are certain instances
wherein the bona fide purchaser will be protected even though
the general rule is in favor of the true owner. In England the
innocent purchaser was given protection where the sale was
consummated in the open market evenafter the bona fide purchaser had been refused blanket protection by the court. 26 At
first the market overt exception applied to all sales in open
Hart and another v Carpenter, 24 Conn. 427 (1856).
'Ann. Cases 1913C, page 1290.
22 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (7th ed. 1775) 449; 5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (3rd ed. rewritten 1923) 99.
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market, but eventually the doctrine was limited to the protection of the purchaser m good faith. The market overt in England
was an open or public market where goods were sold on certain
designated days or other specified times.2 7 As a general rule a
specified area was set aside in each town for use as a market
place, but in London it was said that all shops were market
overts for the goods that were customarily sold there, and such
shops were open markets during the usual sale hours on all days
except Sunday 28
The reasoning behind the open market sales seems to lie in
the fact that anyone could search the markets and discover his
goods if they were unlawfully placed in that market for sale.
Thus it would be possible for a man to recover is property before the rights of an innocent third party complicated the picture. This reasomng is further substantiated by the holding that
the shops of London were only market overts for the goods that
were customarily sold there. It would be unnatural for a person
to seek his silverware in a harness shop. Therefore, the purchaser
of silverware in a harness shop would not come under the protection of the market overt exception to the general rule. The,
only inconsistency in the reasoning would seem to lie in the
holding that the shops in other towns were not open markets.
It would seem logical that even in the other towns a man might
look for his goods in the shops where such goods were ordinarily
sold.
It would be well to note that not all sales in open market
were valid. The purchaser of a horse would not be protected
even though the sale took place in an open market. The court
reasoned that in the case of horses it was possible for the thief
or wroigdoer to drive the horse to a distant market and that the
true owner would not then have an opportunity to find the
horse before it was sold.2 9 There were also other cases where the
market overt exception was not applicable. The courts refused
to protect the purchaser if the goods were the property of the
king, and the same result was reached where the vendee was a
-.

2 Bouv. LAW DICT. (Rawle's 3rd Rev) 2095.
The Case of Market Overt, 5 Co. Rep. 83b, 77 Eng. Rep. 180

(1595).
'2

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (7th ed. 1775) 499; 5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. rewritten 1923) 99.
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pawnbroker. This latter exception resulted from the idea that
the pawnbrokers were engaged n a clandestine trade and were
therefore unworthy of the protection of the courts. 30
The law as thus developed in England was later codified
in the Sale of Goods Act.31 Thus it is probable that the same
results will be reached today under the statutory provisions as
were reached under the fifteenth century common law.
The courts of the United States have consistently held that
there are no market overts in this country 32 In one of the leading cases, 33 the defendant had purchased butter at a market
place. The butter was not the property of the vendor and the
court found that the purchaser was not protected. In the decision the court pointed out that a market overt was a place established in a town, under the supervision or authority of the
supreme power, for buying and selling. The evidence proved that
no place had been thus established in the Commonwealth, and
consequently there were no market overts in the jurisdiction. That
decision, and others, overlook the fact that the market overt in
England is comparable to the markets and shops of this country
The comparison becomes even more clear when one stops to consider that all of the shops of London are market overts for the
goods that are customarily sold there, and that those shops are
the same as our own shops. If the courts had used this comparison rather than an adherence to a strict definition they would
have established an exception in this country similar to the
market overt exception in England.
The English courts and the courts of the United States have
also made an exception to the general rule, and have protected
the bona fide purchaser in cases involving money or negotiable
instruments. 34 Many reasons have been advanced for allowing
BLACKSTONE, 10C. Cit. supra note 29.
Chapter 71 of 56 & 57 Victoria, 1894, Section 22, subs. 1.
Ventress v. Smith, 10 Pet. 161, 9 L. Ed. 382 (1836) Newkirk v.
Dalton, 17 Ill. 413 (1856), Coombs v Garden, 59 Me. 111 (1871)
Dame v. Baldwin, 8 Mass. 518 (1812) Wheelwright v. Depyster, 1
Johns (N.Y.) 471, 3 Am. Dec. 345 (1806) Roland v. Gundy 5 Ohuo
202 (1831) Easton v Worthington, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 130 (1819)
De Bates v Searls, 52 S.D. 603, 219 N-W 559 (1928) Heacock v.
Walker, 1 Tyler (Vt.) 341 (1802).
"Dame v. Baldwin, 8 Mass. 518 (1812)
3'Miller v Race, 1 Burr. 452 (1758) BRITToN, BILLS & NOTES
(1943) § 87.
'°2
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the purchaser to be protected in tins instance. It has been contended that money has no special characteristic and. that.it can
th.erefore pass free from the claims of the true owner; others
have contended that the title to money and bearer negotiable instruments is in the thing itself and that the possessor therefore
has title to thearticle, still another argument has been based on
the fact that it is a commercial necessity to protect persons that
take money or other negotiable instruments. *While all of the
arguments have merit, it would seem that the main reason for
affording protection to the purchaser is based on the idea of commercial necessity It is comparatively simple to comprehend the
business stagnation that would result if all persons were allowed
to bring actions for the recovery of stolen money or negotiable
instruments. If this were permitted no person would be willing
to accept money or a negotiable instrument, because it would
subject him to a possible future suit to recover the money or
damages for the conversion.
The protection afforded the purchaser of money is limited
to those cases in which the money has passed as currency In
any case where the money passes as a chattel or keepsake it is
treated as any other chattel and the court will allow the true
owner to recover same in an action of trover. 35 The refusal to
protect the purchaser when the money is actually a keepsake or
souvenir is based on the thought that when money reaches this
stage it has in reality lost all of the characteristics of money,
and the rules regarding ordinary chattels should be applied to it.
It is interesting to note the analogies that may be built up
around any rule of law. In one instance a purchaser of gram
from a bailee contended that he should be allowed to retain the
grain when sued by the true owner. The argument advanced was
based on the thought that the grain was similar to money, i.e.,
it had no special characteristics which would enable a person to
tell that gram from any other gram of like grade and type. The
court held that This comparison was not justified, and they allowed the true owner to recover the value of the grain in his
action against the purchaser. 36
zMoss v. Hancock, 2 Q.B. 111 (1899).
'Leslie v Win. Kelley Milling Co., 109 Kan. 146, 197 Pac. 1094
(1921).
L.J.-"
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The court's refusal to protect the bona fide purchaser without title can be justified only if we adopt the theory that title is
paramount. In other words it is necessary for us to depart from
the idea that possession is nine points of the law, and adopt a
course whereby we consider title without regard to the element
of possession. However, even though we adopt this policy, it is
not unjust to hold that in many of the cases the true owner
should be estopped to assert his title. We have consistently allowed, in the absence of statute, the innkeeper's lien on the baggage of the guest regardless of whether or not title to the baggage was in the guest. 37 If this departure from the title theory is
made in that instance there seems to be no justifiable reason
why it should not be extended to protect the purchasers from
vendors without title.
In the one instance wherein the purchaser is protected in the
United States-in cases of money and negotiable instrumentsthe reason given for the exception seems to be based on the commercial necessity of the proposition. Is it not also true that commercial necessity demands that protection be given in other
cases
The law at the present time is only correct if one is laboring
under the theory that title is paramount. However, even then the
courts should, by an estoppel, protect the purchaser unless there
is recorded evidence of title. In Rolanvd v. GCundy3s the court
points out that public policy brought about protection of the
true owner, but the opinion justly concludes "I do not readily
comprehend how it ever can be consistent with public policy to
adopt any principle which operates unjustly "

Thoma v Remington Typewriter Co., 11 Ohio Cir. Ct. R.
(N.S.) 174.
' 5 Ohio 202 (1831)
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